

Low and Intermediate Level Waste Management

CSA example

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Scientific seminar in the framework of « Paldiski » project » CSA, 17/11/2015

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- 1. CSA general overview, capacity and characteristics
- 2. Waste disposal concept
- 3. Installations of the disposal facility
- 4. Waste packages
- 5. Safety cases
- 6. Waste acceptance criteria
- 7. Waste package authorisation



1. General overview, capacity and characteristics



- Type of facility: Basic Nuclear Installation
- Area: 95 hectares including 30 reserved for disposal
- Industrial start-up: 1992
- Operational period: 60 to 70 years, then monitoring period of 300 years





1. General overview, capacity and characteristics





Disposal capacity: 1,000,000 m³

 Annual average volume: 12,000 m³ of waste packages disposed of, or 30,000 waste packages


About 400 disposal vaults foreseen






At end of December 2014:

◆ 291,975 m³ disposed, equivalent to 29,2% of the total capacity





Waste origine in volume (year 2012)



EDF (NPP)
 AREVA (fuel treatment)
 Other




At end of December 2014:

- 127 closed vaults
- 5 operating vaults
- 2 vaults under preparation
- 21 built vaults waiting for operation



Etat des ouvrages au 31 décembre 2014





2. Waste disposal concept "Multi-barrier concept"

Safety objectives

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- CSA waste disposal must respect two fundamental safety objectives defined by regulation and applicable to any radioactive waste surface disposal facility. These objectives are:
 - Immediate and deferred protection of the population and the environment
 - Limitation of the required monitoring time to 300 years after delivery of the last waste package




This implies a limitation of long-lived radionuclides to limit the longterm impact to the period of 300 years




Limit the spread of radioactive materials into the environment through three containment barriers:

- Waste package
- Disposal vaults
- Geological formation (site geological characteristics are specific)
 Post-closure \$\phi\$ long term






The principle of CSA disposal is to confine radioactivity and monitor containment while radioactivity decreases to such a level that there is no more significant radiological risk (after 300 years LILW activity is roughly divided by 1000)







Final cover

Underground galleries, water collection network

Draining layer

Impermeable layer


Deep layers



Geological barrier – 3rd confining barrier



- Protection during operation and monitoring / post-monitoring phase against the effects of water dissemination
 - Geological and hydrogeological features limiting and controling the possible transfers of radioactive materials in the soil
 - Deliver radionuclides to an identified outlet (eg: the Noues d'Amance river)



Criteria for site implementation

- Absence of natural hazards (earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, etc.)
- Absence of natural resources of interest
- Have certain hydrogeological and geochemical qualities enabling to limit the flow of radionuclides and toxic materials likely to reach the outlet and being transferred to humans

Couche imperméable



Disposal vault – 2nd confining barrier

Protection against the effects of external radiation exposure

- Limit the exposure of workers and public
- Reduce the dose rate in contact with the vault walls

Protection against the effects of water dissemination

- Protect waste from rainwater infiltration
- Isolate waste from telluric water
- Limit the release of radionuclides through the vaults
- Direct the water seeping into the vaults to the underground water collection galleries' network





Waste package - 1st confining barrier

Protection against the effects of external radiation exposure

- Limit the exposure of workers and public
- Reduce the dose rate in contact with package
- Protection against the effects of water dissemination
 - Protect waste from rain and telluric water
 - Limit the activity likely to be released
 - Limit the initial activity
 - Immobilize waste
- Protection against the effects of air dissemination
 - Limit the risk of waste dispersion (mainly in case of package drop)
 - Limit the gaseous releases











Package delivery by shipping containers or sheeted trailers

After delivery controls, the waste package can be held in the Transit building yard or unloading at the Waste Packaging Workshop





Transit Building activities & organisation




Transit building	Under control package storage area	Package temporary storage area	
yard temporary	Vehicle lanes		Package temporary storage area
storage area	Noncompliant package storage area	i storage tools	3



Waste Packaging Workshop: Compaction area












Waste Packaging Workshop: Injection area



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3. Installations of the disposal facility



Two type of vaults:

Concrete filled vaults

Gravel filled vaults

disposal operated away from rain under mobile structures












Gravel-filled vaults (OG) disposal concept







Gravelling when vault completed




100



Concrete-filled vaults (OB) disposal concept







Each layer is completed with concrete when a vault level is completed



4. Waste packages



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Casings	Package code	Pictures	disposal vaults
Metallic drums (for compaction)	12 16 19		OB 3 tons after compaction and conditioning in 450 liters casings
Metallic boxes of 5 m ³ and 10 m ³	31 – 32 71 - 72	9753	OB 12 tons or OB 35 tons
870 L metallic drums	48	US5116.9 (144612) (144612)	OB 3 tons OB 12 tons OB 35 tons



Casings	Package code	Pictures	disposal vaults
450 L metallic drums	49	450	OB 3 tons
Directly disposable 200 L metallic drums	51		OB 3 tons
Steel ingots	54		OB 3 tons



Casings	Package code	Pictures	disposal vaults
Graphite containing boxes	76		OB 35 tons
CBF-K fiber concrete boxes	78 98		OG 35 tons OB 35 tons
C1 concrete shells	81 91		OG 10/35 tons OB 12/35 tons

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Casings	Package code	Pictures	disposal vaults
C4 concrete shells	84 94	5 97	OG 10/35 tons OB 12/35 tons
CBF-C1 fiber concrete shells	88		OG 10 tons
CBF-C2 fiber concrete shells	89		OG 35 tons



Unconventional waste packages :

Reactor vessel heads (example)

Such unconventional waste is not covered by the standard acceptance criteria for disposal at the CSA: specific safety studies shall be done and approved by the French Safety Autority.






Reactor vessel head (removal, disposal and injection)




5. Safety cases





Operational

Post closure



Compliance of the safety level with the objectives to be reached and as a function of the stage of the design development



Operational safety

- Step 1: Risk analysis
 - Identification of risk sources and targets
 - Definition of events
- Step 2: Prioritization of events
 - Selection of events
 - Excluded by design
 - Hypothetical
 - Design events (to be studied)
- Step 3: Identification of design situations (conservative assumptions)
 - Classification of design events
 - Operational or degraded events
 - Incidental events
 - Accidental events
 - Selection of penalising scenarios

- \rightarrow Defense in depth level 1
- \rightarrow Defense in depth level 2
- \rightarrow Defense in depth level 3



Operational safety

Step 4: Review of design situations (conservative assumptions)

- Assessment of radiological and toxic impact
- ♦ Step 5: Design situations for internal emergency plan (realistic assumptions)
 → Defense in depth level 4
 - Assessment of radiological and toxic impact
- Step 6: Extreme situations (i.e. post Fukushima studies)

 \rightarrow Defense in depth level 5

- Identification of events following extreme situations
- Review of extreme situations



Indicators of operational radiological and chemical impacts

Radiological impact

- Public
 - compliance with a dose constraint of 0.25 mSv/year in normal operation
 - punctual individual exposure can be considered as acceptable impact with the value of 10 mSv in accidental situation
- Workers
 - 5 mSv/year in normal operation
 - 10 mSv in accidental situation
 - 100 mSv for public authorities

Chemical impact :


- assessment of the "individual excess risk" (ERI) and the "coefficient of danger" (QD), which gives the risk of cancer associated with chronic exposure to a toxic material
- Constraints: ERI <10⁻⁵ and QD <1

5. Safety cases

Post closure safety

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Qualitative Safety Analysis



Propose design measures

- Identify scenarios to be quantified:
 - Normal Evolution Scenario (NES)
 - Altered Evolution Scenarios (AES)



• Specific or generic measures

In the definition of scenarios:

- In the normal evolution scenario (including sensitivity studies)
- Or in altered evolution scenarios (and their sensitivity studies)



Scenarios for safety analysis

Definitions

The scenario is a description of a sequence of events leading to the transfer of radionuclides to the biosphere and making a calculation of possible impact.

Two main types of scenarios

- Normal evolution scenario (NES)
 - Covers all events considered as sufficiently certain or probable
 - is a verification step in the design and acquisition of knowledge by presenting an integrated view of disposal components with the expected functions

Altered evolution scenarios (AES)

- Describe situations improbable corresponding to:
 - » Failure of one or more safety functions of disposal
 - » Situations of human intrusion
- occurrence after monitoring period (> 350 years)

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5. Safety cases


Example for modelling of water transfer pathways in normal evolution scenarios

Final indicator

 concentration of radionuclides and toxic chemicals in river

Intermediate indicators for detailed analysis of disposal behavior

- Annual activity release rate per package
 - Confining performances of each package type
- Annual activity release rate through underg water and collecting network
 - Confining performances of vaults
- Peclet number
 - Convective or diffusive flow regime
- Distribution of concentrations in aquifer
 - Spatial and temporal mapping





5. Safety cases

Altered evolution scenarios during monitoring period, examples:

- Failure of the cover system »
- Construction of waste packages and vaults after implementation of the cover system »
- Failure of underground gallery »
- Waste packages containment failure » (cracks)
- Rise of underground water and vaults degradation »
- « Pumping Well near the facility »

Altered scenarios after monitoring period : Inadvertent intrusions

- "Road Construction trough the site"
- "Well dug trough disposal"
- "Archaeological excavation",
- "Residential area",
- "Children playing on excavated material"



Indicators of long-term radiological and chemical impacts

Radiological impact

- assessment of individual dose engaged for a human being of a hypothetical critical group living close to the disposal
- compliance with a dose constraint of 0.25 mSv / year in normal evolution scenario,
- discussion on an individual basis for altered evolution scenarios based on the likelihood of the situations represented.

Chemical impact :

- assessment of the "individual excess risk" (ERI) and the "coefficient of danger" (QD), which gives the risk of cancer associated with chronic exposure to a toxic material
- Constraints: ERI <10⁻⁵ and QD <1

5. Safety cases

Safety related radionuclides in normal evolution scenario

Monitoring

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- All disposal components are operating normally:
 - Iow infiltration rate from coverage
 - Packages and vaults efficient
 - Infiltrated water flow partially headed towards RSGE
 - No intrusion
- Only uncaptured RN can reach the groundwater and the river
 - H3, Fe55, Tc99, Mo93, I129, CL36
 - Very little impact

Post-Monitoring

- Assumptions
 - Infiltration equivalent to the natural recharge of the aquifer
 - Vaults and packages under degraded detrital form
 - RSGE closed, residual RN are released into the groundwater and the river

Important criterion

- sorption in disposal materials (concrete and sands)
- Radioactive period of the nuclides
- Radionuclides concerned :
 - ¹³⁵Cs, ⁵⁹Ni, ¹⁰⁷Pd : captured RN maximum impact after 10 000 years
 - ¹²⁹I, ³⁶Cl, ⁹⁹Tc, ⁹³Mo : weakly captured cause a quicker impact
- Low impact : near 2,3.10⁻² mSv/year



Safety related radionuclides in altered evolution scenarios

Post-Monitoring

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- Some of altered scenarios lead to an increased release of sorbed nuclides (package and vault alteration) but do not change significantly the impact nor the most important nuclides
- The most important scenario is the implantation of a well directly on the disposal
 - Increase the impact of the nuclides, up to 7,6 mSv/year
 - Reduce the time to reach the maximum impact (hundred years for uncaptured radionuclides compared to 10,000 years)

Conclusion

 All long lived or uncaptured nuclides are concerned in these altered scenarios

5. Safety cases

Safety related radionuclides in intrusion scenarios

Type of scenario

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- Road construction
- Residential area
- Child playing on excavated material
- Ways of exposure
 - Inhalation exposure (road construction, child games)
 - External exposure (residential)
- Radionuclides of interest
 - Alpha emitters (²⁴¹Am, ²³⁹Pu, ²⁴⁰Pu)
 - Gamma emitters (¹³⁷Cs, ⁹⁴Nb, ^{108m}Ag)



6. Waste acceptance criteria




Acceptance criteria for radioactive waste packages and associated specifications are declined from:


- Basic safety rules (RFS) or guides (from French safety authority)
- Technical requirements
- Orders release
- The safety report (i.e. safety cases)
- The general operating rules (RGE)
- The CSA disposal operating constraints

Compliance with the specifications guarantees the safety of the disposal during the operational phase, the monitoring phase and post-closure, the protection of man and his environment from effects of:

- External radiation exposure
- The spread of radionuclides by water
- The dispersion of radionuclides in the air



6. Waste acceptance criteria



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


The general technical specifications are applicable to all waste packages :

- ACO.SP.ASRE.98-084: Requirements for the agreement and quality monitoring of the waste package
- ACO.SP.ASRE.99-001: General Technical Requirements
- ACO.SP.ASRE.99-002: Requirements on assessment and <u>declaration</u> of radioactive characteristics







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


Specific technical requirements depending on the package type:

- Packages directly disposed
 - ACO.SP.ASRE.99-004: sustainable concrete containers
 - ACO.SP.ASRE.99-005: perishable metallic containers with internal confining casing
 - ACO.SP.ASRE.99-006: perishable metallic containers with confining matrix
- Packages for further processing on CSA before disposal
 - ACO.SP.ASRE.99-007: metallic drums to be compacted
 - ACO.SP.ASRE.99-008: metallic boxes to be injected

SUR.SP.AMES.06-0002: Requirements for sealed radioactive sources out of use

6. Waste acceptance criteria



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Technical tests (in addition to the technical specifications)

Technical Tests applicable to all waste packages:

- TT n°048: Homogeneous waste block homogeneity degree evaluation
- TT n°050: Waste packages freeze-thaw cycles resistance assessment
- TT n°054: Waste packages resistance to gamma irradiation assessment
- TT n°057: Waste packages held under load assessment
- TT n°058: Waste packages drop resistance assessment
- TT n°060: Waste packages fire resistance assessment
- Technical Tests applicable to concrete made casing/matrix
 - TT n°049: Homogeneity and continuity of an envelope evaluation
 - TT n°053: Determination of tritiated water effective diffusion coefficient in a hydraulic binder material
 - TT n°062: Assessment of the gas permeability, water accessible porosity and density of a hydraulic binder material
 - TT n°066: Container-plug connection sealing test




Technical tests (in addition to the technical specifications)

Other specific Technical Tests:

- TT n°051: Waste package tritium/carbon 14 release rate assessment
- TT n°052: Assessment of homogeneous waste block lixiviation resistance
- TT n°061: Water exudation under compressive force assessment
- TT n°063: Waste gas production in alkaline environment characterization
- TT n°064: Evaluation of the mechanical stability of a waste block whose matrix is an alkaline hydraulic binder
- TT n°065: Evaluation of the aggressive nature of homogeneous waste block against envelope




Casing technical drawing (requirements for handling and processing)





Casing technical drawing (example of noncompliance)





General technical requirements (ACO.SP.ASRE.99-001)

Requirements for raw waste

Licensed waste without limitation:

plastics and rubber waste, metal waste, rubble, cellulose waste (excluding wood), glassware, water system and ventilation filters, iodine traps, homogeneous waste (sludge, REI, concentrates, etc.)

• Waste permitted with restrictions:

- wet waste, wood, powdered materials, paint residues, aerosol cans, batteries, neon lights, sources, asbestos waste, greases, paint residues, reactive metal materials (aluminum), etc.
 - » Wet: no liquid easily exudable
 - » Wood: <10% vol, limited number of packages
 - » Paint waste: hardened
 - » Aerosols: pierced
 - » Etc.

Prohibited waste:

Inflammables or explosive materials, free aqueous/organic liquid, compostable, infectious materials, pyrophoric or highly reactive metal waste with hydraulic binder (magnesium), friable asbestos.



6. Waste acceptance criteria


Example for reactive metal materials (studies)

- Aluminum alloys
 - Decreasing corrosion in time
 - Corrosion increases if pH and high temperature
 - If coated in cementitious material:
 - Lower corrosion in saturated conditions
 - Very severe corrosion (300 microns/y) in unsaturated conditions

Magnesium alloys

- Low corrosion rate at pH near 13 (2 microns / year)
- Very important localized corrosion in the presence of chlorides (40 microns/y)
- Corrosion rate increases with temperature (350 microns / year at 50 ° C)
- If coated in cementitious material: low corrosion in unsaturated conditions







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General technical requirements (ACO.SP.ASRE.99-001)

- Chemical characterization
 - Average composition to be determined
 - Toxic chemicals to identify and quantify:
 - Pb, B, Ni, Cr, As, Sb, Se, Cd, Hg, Be, CN, asbestos, CMR
 - Complexing substances to identify and quantify:
 - chlorides, fluorides, nitrates, sulfates, EDTA, acetates, etc.
- Final waste package characteristics
 - Maximal mass,
 - Fire resistance,
 - Drop resistance,
 - Etc.



General technical requirements (ACO.SP.ASRE.99-001)

- Chemical characterization
 - Average composition to be determined
 - Toxic chemicals to identify and quantify:
 - Pb, B, Ni, Cr, As, Sb, Se, Cd, Hg, Be, CN, asbestos, CMR
 - Complexing substances to identify and quantify:
 - chlorides, fluorides, nitrates, sulfates, EDTA, acetates, etc.
- Final waste package characteristics
 - Maximal mass,
 - Fire resistance,
 - Drop resistance,
 - Etc.



Drop resistance (Technical test example - C1 concrete package)

Drop resistance proven:

- No dispersal of radioactive material,
- Biological shielding still sufficient.





Drop resistance (Technical test example – CBF-C2)



- Biological shielding destroyed.



Radioactive requirements (ACO.SP.ASRE.99-002)

- The radiological content must be described for each agreement by an Activity Evaluation File
- This file shall describe:
 - Activities (α , $\beta\gamma$), the type of waste package to measure (box, 200L drum ...) and content (link with the transfer functions),
 - How the radionuclides are measured and reported (method, chain measures and uncertainties on the assessments),
 - In connection with the two points above, the justification of reasonable upper bound nature of the activity evaluation (penalising approach)
- Radionuclides (RN) to be reported
 - RN with half-life > 6 month : if Activity Threshold > Reporting Threshold
 - RN with half-life < 6 month : if Activity > 10% of total package activity

<i>Isotope</i>	Période (ans) (1)	Filiation (2)	Seuil de déclaration (Bq/g)
³ H	1.23E+01		10
¹⁰ Be	1,60E+06		10-4
¹⁴ C	5,73E+03		10



Radioactive requirements (ACO.SP.ASRE.99-002)

- Waste package mass to be reported
 - Directly disposable packages: M package M shield M metallic casing
 - Package to be injected or compacted: Max between M package and M standard
- Activity limits
 - Coating Threshold (CT):
 - Specific activity threshold upon which the confinement of the package shall be proven ("coated package")
 - It depends on
 - » The radionuclides type (one RN could have a specific CT),
 - » The global α and $\beta\gamma$ activity of the package.
 - Maximal limit of activity
 - Specific activity threshold defined for waste packages to respect the global activity licensed per RN on the CSA
 - Homogeneous distribution of activity
 - Limit the amount of activity per volume unit
 - Prohibit the disposal of Mid or High activity waste at CSA by dilution

Particular cases

- radium-bearing waste
- Gaseous waste
- Fissile material



Radioactive requirements (ACO.SP.ASRE.99-002)

- Surface contamination
 - \leq 4 Bq/cm² for $\beta\gamma$ emitters
 - \leq 0,4 Bq/cm² for α emitters
- Nuclear materials
 - Specific declaration based on the content of Pu and U (natural, depleted, low enriched, highly enriched)

Dose rate

- < 2 mSv/h at package contact</p>
- The use of patch is subject to specific acceptance and shall comply with the following rules :
 - Heterogeneous waste package
 - Sustainable fixing
 - Must not exceed the thickness of the package top edge
 - Preferably made of steel



6. Waste acceptance criteria

Focus on patch use (consequences)



Management of Toxic (lead declaration)


Thickness of the package top edge exceeded: risk when package stacking



Focus on patch use: risk when package stacking

Optimal package stacking

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Non compliant package stacking

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Specific requirements for packaging

- ACO.SP.ASRE.99-004 : Sustainable concrete casing
 - Mechanical hull outfit > 0.35 MPa
 - Containment: casing performance (tritiated water diffusion coefficient)
 - Casing thickness, mechanical strength, homogeneity
 - Requirements for casing material:
 - cement, mixing water, additives, formulation, strength, etc.
 - State of the finished package:
 - Shells are acceptable if they show no defects such as
 - » nests of aggregates (gravel, sand, fibers),
 - » exposed reinforcement,
 - » cracks,
 - » Bursts.
- ACO.SP.ASRE.99-005: perishable metallic containers with internal confining casing
 - Containment: internal casing performance (tritiated water diffusion coefficient)
 - Internal casing thickness, mechanical strength, homogeneity



6. Waste acceptance criteria

Focus on concrete package state at delivery: cracks







Non-compliances:

- Confining casing degraded
- Non confining package
- Impact on radionuclide transfer



Focus on concrete package state at delivery: burst



Non-compliances:

- Confining casing degraded
- Non confining package
- Impact on radionuclids transfer

Package laid on a wedge stopper corner





Specific requirements for packaging

- ACO.SP.ASRE.99-006: perishable metallic containers with confining matrix
 - Containment: matrix performance (block lixiviation resistance)
- Requirements on matrix for all packages
 - Immobilization of homogeneous waste
 - Homogeneity (TT n°048)
 - Water content (TT n°061)
 - Mechanical strength:> 8 MPa
 - Gas permeability, porosity, density (TT n°062)
 - Immobilization of heterogeneous waste.
 - Mechanical strength:> 20 Mpa
 - Mortar penetration quality, tensile strength, shrinkage
 - Filling rate




Focus on filling rate

The main objective of this requirement is to limit the possible void in the matrix in order to:

- Fulfill the requirements on mechanical strength,
- Exclude water penetration into the matrix after disposal (example below)





<u>Consequence:</u> Performance degradation

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Focus on the confining requirements for waste packages (Specific activity > CT)

- Confining requirements are based
 - For metallic packages
 - On the performance of the waste matrix or,
 - On the performance of the internal mortar casing
 - For concrete packages
 - On the performance of concrete casing (and the eventual internal mortar casing) or,
 - On the performance of concrete casing and the waste Matrix
- Waste matrix performance
 - Lixiviation test

	Tritium	βγ emitter	α emitter
Da (m²/s)	< 2,10 ⁻¹²	< 6,3,10 ⁻¹³	< 3,2,10 ⁻¹⁷

Focus on the confining requirements for waste packages (Specific activity > CT)

- Internal mortar casing performance
 - Tritiated water diffusion coefficient (De) < 1,7.10⁻¹² m²/s
 - Thickness > 50 mm
- Concrete casing performance
 - Thickness
 - » $L_{cont} = max(L_{conf,} L_{méca}) + L_{deg}$
 - L_{cont} : concrete casing thickness
 - L_{conf}: confining thickness (linked to the tritiated water diffusion coefficient)
 - L_{méca} : mechanical thickness (50 mm)
 - L_{deg} : degradation thickness (20 to 40 mm depending on concrete formulation)
 - Tritiated water diffusion coefficient (De) < 1,75.10⁻¹²xL_{conf}

• With an internal casing : $\frac{L_{conf}}{De} = \frac{L_{conf,casing}}{De_{casing}} + \frac{L_{internal casing}}{De_{internal casing}}$

• Concrete and Matrix confinement: De < 1,1.10⁻¹¹xL_{conf}


De (m²/s)	50 mm	80 mm	100 mm	150 mm
Casing only	< 8,8.10 ⁻¹⁴	< 1,4.10 ⁻¹³	< 1,7.10 ⁻¹³	< 2,6.10 ⁻¹³
Casing and Matrix	< 5,7.10 ⁻¹³	< 9,1.10 ⁻¹³	< 1,1.10 ⁻¹²	< 1,7.10 ⁻¹²

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Tritiated water diffusion coefficient measurement (technical test)

<u>Principle</u> : measuring the activity in the downstream compartment versus time (tritium transfer). Upon reaching steady state, determining the diffusion coefficient.




Materials et specimens dimension:

- 🚸 Cement paste 🛛 4 à 8 mm
- Mortar
- 8 mm
- Concrete 1,6 Øgran (20 mm max)
- Polymer
- 4 mm

2 methods proposed in the TT

Method A

- 3 specimens
- Th. 20 mm max
- Test duration on concrete : 3 to 4 years
- Method A'
 - 15 specimens
 - Th. 16 mm max
 - Test duration on concrete ≈ jusqu'à 2 ans



Main difficulty :

Important duration of test poses problems for the characterization of new concrete or for packages inspection

R&D on tritiated water diffusion coefficient (De) measurement

Development of a new and faster method Measure of *De* under electric field

Principle :


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
- Saturation of the specimen
- Applying an electric field
- Determination of a form factor $F_F = \frac{\Delta U}{L} \frac{SF^2}{RTL} \sum z_i^2 c_i D_{0,i}$

• De calculation
$$D_{e,HTO} = \frac{D_{0,HTO}}{F_{T}}$$

Advantages :

- Duration ≈ 1 hour
- Working in idle
- □ Applicable only on materials of which $De > 10^{-12}$ m²/s (mortars, low confining concrete)
- Pursuit of R&D for use on materials of which De < 10⁻¹² m²/s







Specific requirements for processed waste package


ACO.SP.ASRE.99-007 : compactable drums

- Raw waste
 - Dispersible powdered waste (decanters pots, etc.): Ac < CT, study of resuspension rates,</p>
 - Prohibited waste: asbestos, Be, solvent, oil and grease, sources, flammable and pyrophoric, lead, little deformable or massive parts,
 - Waste restricted: difficult to compact pieces to place in the bottom half of the barrel.
- No waste that can release liquid water
 - Absorbent: water = less than 1% of the volume of the drum prior to compaction,
 - Bottles not drained




Specific requirements for processed waste package

- ACO.SP.ASRE.99-008 : injectable boxes
 - Raw waste
 - Dispersible powdered waste (decanters pots, etc.): Ac < CT, study of resuspension rates,</p>
 - Dispersible waste (earth, sand, etc.) not locked: <10% vol,
 - Asbestos waste: non-friable, < 40 kg, packaged in a box or vinyl layer,
 - Boxes features and mass limit
 - Resistance to the buoyancy exerted on the lid by the mortar
 - **•** > 50.000 Nm for 5 m^3 boxes,
 - > 100,000 Nm for 10 m^3 boxes .
 - Implantation of the injection ports
 - Features of the injection nozzles
 - Features of the internal mesh basket
 - Inner casing (waste-free space)
 - 70 mm below the lid
 - 50 mm for the other walls
 - Lid nozzles features





Injectable boxes: focus on dispersible material



Injection nozzle outlet

Non-compliances:

- Degraded quality of the internal casing
- Unblocked waste matrix
- Injection still possible??




Injectable boxes: focus on mesh basket and nozzles



Potential non-compliances:

- Failure of inner casing establishment
- Waste presence in the inner casing
- Degraded confinement properties



Potential non-compliances:

Injection prohibited



7. Waste package authorisation




Some definitions

- AUTHORISATION: delivered after determination and shared acceptance of operating/technical parameters that will be used in package production
 - "Product" compliance referential : reference used by the manufacturer to determine compliance at the end of production of a package
- ACCEPTANCE of delivery imposed on the basis of implemented quality control requirements that are:
 - Likely to give confidence in the producer's ability to produce packages as approved in operational parameters
 - Auditable (defining who does what, when, how?) and sustainable
- For the processing of agreement and acceptance approval, a tool: COMPLIANCE MATRIX
 - Exhaustive review of Andra specifications requirements,
 - Identification of derogations
 - A key quality recording related to the agreement and acceptance



Authorization/Acceptance process (similar for an authorization revision)



- DPA: Description of agreement project
- MC: Conformity matrix at different filling stages (0, 1, 2, 3 and 4)
- DP: Process description
- DEA: Activity Evaluation description
- DC: characterization file



Compliance Matrix

- Established by Andra (then completed by the producer) from the software "MCAC (Package Authorization Compliance Matrix)"
- Requirements to be met selected according to the following parameters:
 - Package Type
 - Selecting a specification from 99004-99008
 - Specific activity
 - < or > CT
 - Nature of waste
 - Heterogeneous or homogeneous
 - Nature of the matrix
 - Hydraulic binder (LH), polymer (P) or bitumen (B)
 - Containment provided by
 - Envelope (E) or Block (B) or Envelope + Block (E + B)




Filling stages of the compliance matrix

Critère	<mark>o pr</mark> is en					Matrice Liant Hydraulique, Confinem	ont : Bloc + Env		
L		Cole	onne 1	Colonne 2	Colonne 3	Colonne 4	_	Colonne 5	Colonne 6
	EXIGENCES ANDRA			RESPECT DE L'EXIGENCE		JUSTIFICATIF DE LA REPUNSE	REFERENTIE L CONFORMIT E PRODUIT		DISPOSITIONS D'ORGANISATION (Références documentaires
N.	Spéc.	§	Libellé	Oui Non Sans objet	DEROGATION	FAITE EN COLONNE 2	Oui Non	pour respecter l'exigence)	où sont décrits les gestes effectués sur le terrain)
	1	3.1.3.1	Absence de produits ou mélanges présentant des risques d'inflammation ou d'explosion ou de réaction exothermique br <u>utale</u>						
2		Μ	CO que e défini		C1	MC2		MC3	MC4
Ļ		sta	age ⁹⁷⁻¹⁰⁴⁸	st	age _	stage		stage	stage
3		(An	dra) des	(Proc	ducer)	(Producer) —	(Producer) —	(Producer)
4			organiques				Ì	·	
5	1	3.1.3.1	Absence matières putréscibles t.q. cadavres d'animaux						
6	1	3.1.3.1	Absence de déchets métalliques pyrophoriques ou très fortement réactifs t.q. magnésium finement divisé, sodium et alliage de sodium						
7	1	3.1.3.1	Absence de déchets contenant de l'amiante friable (libre)						
8	1	1	Absence de récipients contenant des liquides						
9	1	3.1.3.3.2. 1	Les déchets humides compactables ne doivent pas contenir de liquide facilement exsudable : absence égoutture suite à pressage manuel						



Phase prior to inquiry



Main objective


- Establish the applicable reference for the package conditioning process
 - List of requirements to be met
- Source
 - General and technical specifications



Instruction of the authorisation application

🚸 Goal

- Limit the risk of non-compliant package production
- Ensure the detection of non-compliant package before delivery to the CSA
- Ensure "stability" of production over time






Instruction of the acceptance

Goal

- Decline in the production site applicable documentation:
 - The technical provisions (column 5 of the MC)
 - Andra organizational specifications (for example, those related to the provisions to be applied by the production site in case of producing a non-compliant package, or those related to reporting procedures and shipments (PROCOMX))





Break